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Abstract Several studies have shown that path-dependent organizations may
pathologically reproduce their paths even in times of crisis. The unchallenged
retention of underlying strategic premises seems to play a key role in this self-
destructive process. Whereas the previous literature largely assumes that organi-
zational crises provide sufficient impetus for updating strategic premises, recent
empirical studies have highlighted that path-dependent organizations may find this
highly difficult. In the present study, I explore how path-dependent organizations
stabilize strategic premises even in times of crisis. Drawing on a case study of the
funeral industry, I theoretically distill four mechanisms that stabilize strategic
premises in path-dependent organizations despite the fierce pressures of organiza-
tional crises. While these mechanisms constitute either reflexive modes of pro-
cessing feedback or generative modes of producing market outcomes, they all
inhibit a disconfirmation and, thus, an update of strategic premises. Furthermore, the
study presents indicative evidence of how this unchallenged retention of strategic
premises leads to the pathological reproduction of the path.
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1 Introduction
The concept of path dependence has recently received increased attention in
management research (e.g., Gruber 2010; Hutzschenreuter et al. 2007; Maielli 2015;
Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand 2010). Path dependence refers to a success-
driven process that may lead organizations into a state of persistence in which they
continuously reproduce a strategic pattern (Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand
2010). While previous literature has traditionally focused on exploring resource-
based and routine-based reasons for such persistence, recent works bring the
underlying strategic premises of paths into focus to induce a better understanding of
this phenomenon (Gilbert 2005; Koch 2011; Miller and Chen 1994; Rothmann
2013; Tripsas 2009). Strategic premises tightly narrow the scope of action for the
selection of strategic alternatives to the extent that paths seem to be reproduced as
long as the underlying strategic premises remain unchanged (Rothmann and Koch
2014; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). With that, unchanged strategic premises seem to
constitute the main—if not the most important—driver of path reproduction
(Tripsas 2009).
Prior literature predominantly suggests that path-dependent organizations update
their strategic premises at the latest when they are struck by crises, i.e.,
environmental changes that render path reproduction inefficient and threaten
organizational survival (e.g., Dobusch and Kapeller 2013; Pearson and Clair 1998;
Tushman and Anderson 1986). The negative feedback that organizational crises
generate is deemed sufficient to challenge the status quo and begin a process of
reflection on, and revision of, strategic premises (Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl
2007). Along with the adjustment of strategic premises, such shocks would re-
broaden the scope for off-path activities (Koch 2011; Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and
Durand 2010).
Paradoxically, prior research has shown that path-dependent organizations may
not change their underlying strategic premises despite severe crises. Instead, these
organizations may leave their strategic premises uncontested even in times of crisis
and pathologically reproduce their established path instead of conducting strategic
change (e.g., Gilbert 2005; Rothmann and Koch 2014; Sull 1999). The uncontested
retention of strategic premises even in times of crisis indicates the existence of
mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises (e.g., Geiger and Antonacopoulou
2009; McKinley et al. 2014; Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). These mecha-
nisms have remained unexplored so far (Bingham and Kahl 2014; Dobusch and
Schu¨ßler 2013; Eggers and Kaplan 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman 2013; Tripsas
2009).
The scant attention devoted to mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises is
surprising, given that previous literature emphasizes the retention of strategic
premises as an important reason for path reproduction in times of crisis (Rothmann
and Koch 2014; Tripsas 2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Thus, although prior
research has made considerable progress in gaining a better understanding of the
pathological reproduction of paths, exploring the mechanisms that inhibit the update
of strategic premises may provide valuable complementary insights into this
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phenomenon (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst 2013; Rothmann and Koch 2014;
Sydow et al. 2012a). Given that only a minor portion of path-dependent
organizations seem to be able to leave, and most organizations seem to
pathologically reproduce, their path despite threatening crises, it seems that further
research on the pathological reproduction of paths is warranted (McKinley et al.
2014). Therefore, the present study aims to increase our knowledge on this
phenomenon by exploring how path-dependent organizations stabilize strategic
premises even in times of crisis.
I address this issue in a case study of the funeral industry in Berlin, Germany.
After decades of success in which a predominant strategic pattern had emerged, the
focal industry was hit by a major downturn at the end of the 1990s when so-called
‘‘discount funeral homes’’ exerted pressure on prices with supra-regional online
offers. Consistent with their strategic premises, the incumbents reacted to this crisis
with efforts to restore the efficiency of the established strategic pattern. These
responses did not alleviate the crisis, and yet, the underlying strategic premises
remained uncontested. In analyzing these developments, I identify four mechanisms
that stabilize strategic premises in path-dependent organizations even in times of
crisis. These mechanisms relate to the reflexive processing of market feedback and
the generative production of market outcomes that reinforce strategic premises. The
presented findings indicate that the stabilized strategic premises leave little scope
for deviations from the established strategic pattern and lead to the pathological
reproduction of the path.
The results presented in this paper offer several extensions of the literature on
path dependence and related research. First, this paper complements prior works on
path reproduction with tentative insights into the retention of strategic premises.
Due to the important role of premise stability for path reproduction, the explored
mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises even in times of crisis and, therefore,
obstruct strategic change shed further light on the pathological reproduction of paths
and incumbents’ challenges to conduct strategic change (Rothmann and Koch 2014;
Tripsas 2009). Second, this paper offers a more nuanced understanding of the
uncontested retention of strategic premises even in times of crisis. By unbundling
mechanisms of premise stabilization, this paper suggests that challenging strategic
premises does not result from the reception of negative feedback per se but depends
on how organizations process incoming feedback (Koch et al. 2009). The explored
mechanisms of reflexive feedback processing provide indicative evidence of how
organizations avoid a disconfirmation of their strategic premises in response to
negative feedback. Third, this paper extends beyond the discussion of feedback
processing by opening the theoretical perspective for the endogenous creation of
market outcomes. While previous literature has predominantly focused on
‘‘myopic’’ feedback processing in which strategic premises ‘‘self-perpetuate’’, the
present findings indicate that organizations may also actively engage in market
activities to produce market outcomes that do not disconfirm strategic premises
(e.g., Gilbert 2006; Koch 2008; Miller 1994). With that, the paper also adds to the
debate on agency by suggesting that path-dependent organizations may use their
agency to pathologically extend their path (e.g., Duschek 2010; Garud et al. 2010;
Sydow et al. 2012a).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, I review previous
literature on path dependence and related research to clarify the predominant
understanding of the concept and the role of strategic premises that this literature
highlights. In Sect. 3, I describe the applied methodology and in Sect. 4, I present
the findings of my empirical analysis of the case of incumbent funeral homes in
Berlin that led to the identification of mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises
even in times of crisis. In Sect. 5, I discuss theoretical contributions and
implications of these findings and provide directions for future research.
2 Path dependence and strategic premises
Since its inception by David (1985) and Arthur (1989), the concept of path
dependence has found application in many fields of research, such as economics,
sociology, political science, and information systems (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000;
Sambamurthy et al. 2003; Shapiro and Varian 1999). Management scholars have
also extensively referred to path dependence to explain a variety of strategic
phenomena (Vergne and Durand 2011). In line with debates on further conceptual
advancements of path dependence in managerial contexts, recent contributions to
the management literature have disseminated a more comprehensive understanding
of the concept (Garud et al. 2010; Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand 2010).
Based on these works, management scholars have come to understand path
dependence predominantly as a process that explains the reduction of managerial
scope over time (Dobusch and Kapeller 2013). Path dependence provides powerful
answers to both how and why strategic patterns—the selected combination of
organizational routines and resources—are reproduced (Koch 2008, 2011; Vergne
and Durand 2011). Although certain conceptual details remain subject to further
debate, Dobusch and Kapeller (2013) identified a theoretical consolidation of path
Fig. 1 The constitution of a path (Sydow et al. 2009: 692)
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dependence based on a common understanding that analytically distinguishes
between three phases: contingency, self-reinforcement, and lock-in (see also Fig. 1).
At the beginning of path-dependent processes, the range of variety is
considerably broad. Although strategic choice is hardly predictable based on initial
conditions or prior events, the strategic decisions made in this phase affect the
outcome of the process (David 1985).
A seemingly small and oftentimes random choice of an option may unwittingly
trigger self-reinforcing mechanisms, i.e., processes that generate positive feedback
on the selection of a specific strategic option while gradually rendering strategic
alternatives unattractive (Arthur 1989). Prominent examples include coordination
effects, i.e., ‘‘covering utility resulting from others following the same path’’
(Dobusch and Schu¨ßler 2013: 623), and adaptive expectation effects, i.e., the
development of expectations ‘‘in response to the expectations of others’’ (Sydow
et al. 2009: 700). These mechanisms may unfold their self-reinforcing effects even
beyond organizational boundaries (Dobusch and Schu¨ßler 2013; Maielli 2015;
Schmidt and Braun forthcoming).
When organizations eventually reproduce one prevailing strategic pattern, they
have entered a state of lock-in, a situation in which they have only a limited corridor
of options available (Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand 2010). Although lock-
ins are an organizational phenomenon, they do not seem to be idiosyncratic to single
organizations in all cases. Particularly in mature industries, the strategic activities of
incumbents tend to converge to the extent that several, or even all, organizations
within an industry may be trapped in the same path (Benner and Tripsas 2012;
Kunow et al. 2013; Lampel and Shamsie 2003; Rothmann and Koch 2014; Vergne
and Durand 2011).
Although lock-ins may eventually become inefficient, they may not be
problematic from the outset. The positive feedback that produces a predominant
strategic pattern may lead affected organizations to a strategic fit with the
environment (Vergne and Durand 2011). Therefore, path-dependent organizations
may reproduce a strategic pattern successfully for long periods of time (Rothmann
and Koch 2014). However, a successful strategic pattern may turn into a burden
when the environment changes (Leonard-Barton 1992). Because the corridor of
options is sacrificed for improving the fit of a strategic pattern to the given
environmental conditions, affected organizations do not perceive any scope of
action to adapt their strategic pattern to environmental changes (Sydow et al. 2009).
Therefore, a formerly successful strategic pattern may eventually become
misaligned with the new environmental conditions and can hardly be changed
(Rothmann and Koch 2014; Vergne and Durand 2011).
While path dependence theory illuminates how affected organizations lose their
scope of action over time, the broader management literature on incumbents’
rigidities sheds further light on the challenges of path-dependent organizations to
change their strategic patterns in response to changes in the environment (e.g.,
Christensen and Bower 1996; Kaplan 2008; Miller 1993; Tripsas 1997; Tushman
and Anderson 1986). In particular, this stream of literature has predominantly
explored resource-based and routine-based reasons for the stability of strategic
patterns (Eggers and Kaplan 2013; Gilbert 2005; Hill and Rothaermel 2003).
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Resource-based reasons relate to organizations’ unwillingness to change resource
investments because of tendencies to exploit prior investments in the optimality of
existing strategic patterns, increased opportunity costs, and risk avoidance
(Christensen and Bower 1996; March 1991; Miller and Chen 1994). Routine-based
reasons refer to organizations’ inability to adapt the processes that use resources,
which results in an inappropriate use of acquired resources under new environ-
mental conditions and an insufficient exploration of strategic alternatives (Burgel-
man 2002; Danneels 2011; Gilbert and Bower 2002). Resource-based and routine-
based reasons for the stability of strategic patterns have emerged almost
independently. However, given the complexity of path-dependent processes, recent
contributions to this stream of literature emphasize that resource-based and routine-
based reasons for the stability of strategic patterns appear jointly in most cases of
path dependence (Eggers and Kaplan 2013; Gilbert 2005; Hill and Rothaermel
2003; Kaplan and Henderson 2005; Rothmann and Koch 2014).
Recent contributions to the literature on incumbents’ rigidities and path
dependence emphasize that both resource-based and routine-based reasons for the
stability of strategic patterns can largely be traced back to organizations’ unchanged
strategic premises (Benner and Tripsas 2012; Gilbert 2005, 2006; Koch 2011;
Rothmann and Koch 2014; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Strategic premises are the
basic assumptions on which strategic patterns are based and consist of a system’s
self-understanding and its perception of the environment (Albert and Whetten 1985;
Porac and Thomas 1989). In mature industries, the strategic premises of market
players may converge even across different institutional frameworks (Benner and
Tripsas 2012; Flier et al. 2003; Huff 1982; Porac et al. 1989; Spender 1989). While
strategic premises generally guide strategic choice, they may become particularly
problematic in lock-ins (Tripsas 2009). Because strategic premises constitute an
essential part of the organizational context in which the strategic path is engraved,
they tightly constrain strategic activities in lock-ins due to constrained perceptions
or normative rejections of strategic alternatives and the contraction of resource
investments (Koch 2011; Miller and Chen 1994; Rothmann 2013; Sydow et al.
2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Therefore, the literature on incumbents’ rigidities
and path dependence regards the update of potentially obsolete strategic premises in
lock-ins as a necessary pre-condition for strategic change in lock-ins (Rothmann and
Koch 2014; Tripsas 2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000).
The literature on incumbents’ rigidities and path dependence predominantly
explains the persistence of obsolete strategic premises by ascribing myopia to the
path-dependent organizations, i.e., the failure to recognize the need for an update of
strategic premises (Eggers and Kaplan 2013; Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009;
Koch 2008). Thus, this literature strengthens the idea that path-dependent
organizations filter out negative feedback that would challenge their strategic
premises (Burgelman 1994; Koch 2011; Levinthal and March 1993; Rothmann
2013; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Tripsas 2009). In this way, strategic premises
become ‘‘self-perpetuating’’ (Gilbert 2006: 152; Miller 1994): the affected
organizations perceive their environment from the background of their strategic
premises and become ‘‘blind’’ for feedback that would challenge their strategic
premises.
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However, although path-dependent organizations may ‘‘myopically’’ ignore the
need for an update of strategic premises for a long period of time, prior literature on
incumbents’ rigidities and path dependence emphasizes that these organizations
hardly seem to do so when they are struck by a severe crisis (Dobusch and Kapeller
2013; Hill and Rothaermel 2003; Levinthal and March 1993; Schreyo¨gg and
Kliesch-Eberl 2007; Tushman and Anderson 1986). Organizational crises are
situations that threaten the survival of the affected organizations and, therefore,
challenge existing strategic premises in which the reproduced strategic pattern is
embedded (Pearson and Clair 1998). Due to the strongly negative feedback that
these threatening situations generate, path-dependent organizations seem to become
aware of problems with underlying strategic premises, to be motivated to reflexively
search for alternative strategic premises, and to replace obsolete premises with new,
supposedly superior, strategic premises (Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). Thus,
beyond the debate on the role of agency with which organizations may possibly
extend or even create a new path based on the same strategic premises, there seems
to be a minimal consensus that organizational crises provide sufficient impetus for
updating strategic premises (Duschek 2010; Garud and Karnøe 2001; Garud et al.
2010; Meyer and Schubert 2007; Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007; Sydow et al.
2009, 2012a).
However, some organizations in a variety of industries have been shown to be
unable to update their strategic premises in times of crisis despite the strongly
negative feedback they received (Eggers and Kaplan 2013; Gilbert 2005; Koch
2011; MacKay and Chia 2013; Maielli 2015; Miller and Chen 1994; Rosenbloom
2000; Rothmann and Koch 2014; Schreyo¨gg et al. 2011; Sull 1999; Tripsas 1997,
2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). For example, Rothmann and Koch (2014)
presented the case of path-dependent organizations in an industry that were struck
heavily by a severe crisis. In contrast to a ‘‘failure to act’’ (Weick 1979: 149), these
organizations evoked an elevated number of strategic initiatives in response to the
strongly negative feedback they received. Yet, these actions did not lead to strategic
change but were aimed at restoring the efficiency of the formerly successful
strategic pattern because the underlying strategic premises remained uncontested
(see also Gilbert 2005; Gilbert and Bower 2002). Sull (1999) notably referred to this
phenomenon as ‘‘the dynamics of standing still.’’
The uncontested retention of strategic premises despite the shock-inducing forces
of crises indicates that, as opposed to self-reinforcing mechanisms that provide
positive feedback on reproducing strategic patterns, self-destructive mechanisms
that stabilize and, therefore, avert an update of strategic premises in light of
disconfirming feedback must be at work (Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009;
Langley et al. 2013; McKinley et al. 2014; MacKay and Chia 2013; Schreyo¨gg and
Kliesch-Eberl 2007). Because these mechanisms seem to inhibit strategic change by
leaving strategic premises uncontested, they may provide further insights into the
pathological reproduction of paths (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst 2013; Roth-
mann and Koch 2014; Sydow et al. 2012a). However, despite the emphasized
importance of updating strategic premises for strategic change, there is surprisingly
little prior work that provides more detailed answers to the question of how path-
dependent organizations retain their obsolete strategic premises even in times of
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crisis (Bingham and Kahl 2014; Dobusch and Schu¨ßler 2013; Eggers and Kaplan
2013; O’Reilly and Tushman 2013; Tripsas 2009).
3 Methods
3.1 Design and empirical setting
To explore how path-dependent organizations stabilize strategic premises even in
times of crisis, I conducted a qualitative case study with a longitudinal retrospective
research design (Sydow et al. 2012b; Yin 2014). Because of the dearth of prior
research on stabilizing mechanisms, a qualitative case study seemed particularly
suitable to explore these mechanisms (Yin 2014). Furthermore, the complexity of
both paths and strategic premises suggested qualitative methods to draw informed
conclusions concerning their social dynamics (Dobusch and Kapeller 2013; Durand
and Vaara 2009; Eisenhardt 1989). I chose a longitudinal retrospective design
because paths, strategic premises, and the underlying mechanisms may best be
observed in such a design (Dobusch and Schu¨ßler 2013; Dutton and Dukerich 1991;
Langley et al. 2013).
The case of incumbent organizations in the funeral industry in Berlin, Germany,
provided a compelling empirical site in which the phenomenon of interest was
particularly salient (Strauss 1987). Especially in the analyzed period from 1996 to
2010, it constituted a ‘‘talking pig’’ for a rigid strategic pattern that once was
successful but has since become a burden (Breuer and Daumann 2010; Siggelkow
2007). The incumbents in the funeral industry in Berlin constituted a unique case
because they were the few players worldwide that were struck by a severe crisis due
to the market entrance of so-called ‘‘discount funeral homes’’ in the 1990s (Akyel
2013; Yin 2014). The market activities of these players deviated sharply from the
incumbents’ established, formerly successful strategic pattern, which had dramatic
consequences for its outcome (Breuer and Daumann 2010). As illustrated in Fig. 2,
revenues decreased drastically in the following years and, after a brief upturn,











Fig. 2 Revenues per funeral home in EUR (own calculations based on data provided by Destatis)
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fierce pressures in this region and the resulting crisis of incumbent funeral homes,
the organizations hardly deviated from their established strategic pattern (Breuer
and Daumann 2010). This indicated that the incumbents’ underlying strategic
premises had remained unchallenged because of stabilizing mechanisms (Bingham
and Kahl 2014; Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007; Tripsas 2009).
In line with observations of path dependence in other mature industries, the
strategic activities and underlying strategic premises of incumbent funeral homes in
Berlin strongly converged, and the industry’s incumbents were equally affected by
Table 1 Overview of interview data
Expert Position Number of interviews Length
1 Funeral director, head of an industry association 2 01:09:05
01:25:02
2 Funeral director, publicist about funeral issuesa
3 Cemetery administrator 2 01:11:10
01:32:59
4 Funeral director, head of an industry association 2 01:16:12
01:40:46
5 Head of an industry association 2 01:43:21
01:04:35
6 Consultant for funeral homes 2 01:07:13
01:01:16
7 Supplier for funeral homes 2 01:51:45
01:34:41
8 Funeral director 2 01:15:37
01:48:04
9 Funeral director 2 02:10:00b
02:07:00b
10 Supplier for funeral homes 2c 00:56:56
11 Funeral director 2 00:44:22
01:46:30
12 Funeral director, head of an industry association 2 01:14:04
01:57:08
13 Funeral director 2 01:08:06
02:16:33






a I conducted the interviews with Expert 2 jointly with Expert 1
b No audio material available
c I conducted the second interview with Expert 10 jointly with Expert 7. Therefore, I reduced the
indicated sum of interviews by one
Business Research (2015) 8:265–299 273
123
the market entry of discount funeral homes (Breuer and Daumann 2010; Kunow
et al. 2013; Rothmann and Koch 2014; Vergne and Durand 2011). Thus, even if the
organizations might have differed in peculiar aspects, these differences were too
small to deviate from the same strategic path (Becker 2004; Burgelman 2010).
Accordingly, variations among individual players were insufficient for cross-case
comparisons (Eisenhardt 1989). This lack of variation facilitated the joint analysis
of the strategic activities and the stabilization of the underlying strategic premises of
the incumbent funeral homes in Berlin as a holistic single case (Klein et al. 1994;
Yin 2014).
3.2 Data collection
To capture rich insights into the studied phenomenon and to facilitate data
triangulation, I relied on multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2014). Accordingly, the
data collection followed a three-stage process. First, to obtain a rich understanding
of the context and to unveil the path by putting the path into perspective, I accessed
secondary data on the funeral industry in Berlin for the period of interest (Eisenhardt
1989; Sydow et al. 2012b). In particular, I gathered quantitative data on the overall
developments in the studied arena. Because published data on the funeral industry
were highly aggregated in most cases and, therefore, provided few insights into the
industry’s peculiar developments in Berlin, I contacted the Federal Statistical Office
of Germany (Destatis) to obtain more fine-grained data (available upon request).
Furthermore, I searched for newspaper articles in relevant databases (LexisNexis,
Wiso) based on keywords (‘‘funeral industry AND Berlin,’’ ‘‘funeral home AND
Berlin,’’ etc.). After having read all of the articles that I found, I saved the (399)
relevant ones for further analysis.
Second, because patterned activities can be recalled and communicated and their
underlying premises are revealed in narratives, I gathered primary data by
conducting 25 interviews (Garud et al. 2010; see Table 1). The dynamics of path
dependence may be beyond the control of actors within affected systems, which
means that external observers are a particularly valuable source for the reconstruc-
tion of paths (Sydow et al. 2012b). Because path dependence is a phenomenon that
spans multiple levels of analysis, interviewing experts appeared to be particularly
promising for generating rich insights (Klein et al. 1994; Koch 2011; Sydow et al.
2012b; Vergne and Durand 2010, 2011). Therefore, I conducted semi-structured
interviews with central experts on the funeral industry in Berlin (Klag and Langley
2013). The selection of interviewees did not follow guidelines for statistical
sampling procedures. Instead, as required for qualitative studies, I selected interview
partners based on theoretical criteria, i.e., to obtain rich insights into the
phenomenon of interest, the interviewees were required to have extended
knowledge of the path of the incumbent organizations in the funeral industry in
Berlin, the path’s underlying strategic premises, and the mechanisms that stabilize
these premises (Eisenhardt 1989; Koch 2011; Langley et al. 2013). I identified these
experts either through their repeated appearance as interviewed experts in
newspaper articles or based on the recommendations of industry associations
(Miles and Huberman 1994). To ensure trustworthiness, they were also required to
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have diverse knowledge backgrounds for triangulation purposes (Lincoln and Guba
1985). Therefore, several experts selected for this study differed with regard to their
positions within the industry, e.g., consultants, suppliers, and cemetery adminis-
trators. Thus, they engaged with the focal organizations for different purposes.
Because some of the experts performed industry-related meta-functions, e.g., as
representatives, and simultaneously were owners of long-established incumbent
funeral homes, the analysis of the data facilitated both the reconstruction of the
strategic premises of the organizations in the focal industry and a rich understanding
of the path-dependent dynamics involved (Sydow et al. 2012a). As noted above, the
narrative reports of the interviewed funeral directors on their limited scope of
strategic activities as well as the underlying strategic premises that could be
reconstructed from these interviews were astonishingly similar. The triangulation of
these accounts with data gathered through interviews with external observers aided
in the identification of certain blind spots to analyze and better understand the path
in which the incumbent funeral homes were trapped (Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl
2007). The interviews lasted for a total of more than 36 h, with an average interview
length of approximately 87 min. All but two of the interviews were audiotaped and
transcribed for further analysis. One interviewee refused to be audio-recorded; these
interviews were recorded in writing and the content of the protocols were
subsequently verified and confirmed by the interviewee (Miles and Huberman
1994). In the process of analyzing the data, I continuously contacted the experts via
informal phone calls to develop and revise the emerging findings (Lincoln and Guba
1985).
Third, I acknowledged that narrative reports of strategic patterns may diverge
from factual performance (Koch 2011). Thus, after a preliminary analysis of the
collected data, I verified the existence of patterned strategic activities by gathering
data through direct on-site observations in ten incumbent funeral homes in Berlin
(Calori 2002). I relied on the principles of theoretical sampling by selecting
prototypical organizations in which the phenomenon of interest could best be
observed (Eisenhardt 1989). I identified these funeral homes based on the
recommendations of the interviewed experts (Miles and Huberman 1994). Whereas
most funeral directors allowed data collection for at most 1 h, I was able to enter
two prototypical funeral homes for two workdays each. I observed all parts of the
value chain, from first contact with consumers in the funeral home to the delivery of
the service at the cemetery (with subcontractors). I immediately recorded my
observations through field notes and wrote extended reports at the end of each day
of observation (Miles and Huberman 1994). Additionally, I conducted follow-up
interviews with all experts to verify and increase the trustworthiness of my findings
(Lincoln and Guba 1985).
3.3 Data analysis
In preparation for the data analysis, I imported all of the gathered data into the
qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti, v7.1, to construct a case study database
that would increase reliability (Yin 2014). Next, I used this software to code,
categorize, and analyze the gathered data.
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The analysis of gathered data proceeded in two main stages. First, I conducted a
path analysis to verify whether path dependence existed in the funeral industry in
Berlin at all (Sydow et al. 2009). In contrast to grounded theory approaches that start
theory-building without any theoretical preferences, path analyses may draw on
established frameworks to derive codes deductively (Glaser and Strauss 1967;
Sydow et al. 2012b). In particular, I used Koch’s (2008, 2011) framework for the
analysis of strategic paths (see Table 2). This procedure began with a ‘‘path
assumption’’—the presumption that the observed rigidity follows a path-dependent
pattern—and was composed of (1) the identification of at least one strategic pattern
that is persistently reproduced over time; (2) the detection of at least one positive
feedback loop that is related to the identified strategic pattern; (3) the recognition of
a critical event in the environment that renders the pattern inefficient; (4) an
examination of the ability to overcome the discovered rigidity by observing whether
responses to the critical event, if existent, are not successful; and (5) the
identification of the reasons for path dependence as being either resource-based
(resource constraints) or of a cognitive (alternatives not recognized) or normative
(alternatives recognized but still rejected) character. To obtain such fine-grained
insights, this procedure permeated different levels of analysis, i.e., ‘‘strategic
activities (‘what a strategic system does and what it does not do’), strategic talk
(‘what a strategic system ‘‘says’’/does not ‘‘say’’’), strategic reflection (‘how a
strategic system justifies what it does/‘‘says’’’), and strategic basic assumptions (‘to
what kind of strategic premises a strategic system refers’)’’ (Koch 2011: 347; see
Table 2 Coding structure (path analysis)
Coding category Description
The path




Positive feedback loops related to the strategic pattern
Critical environmental change and reactions to the crisis
Rationality shift Critical events that render the strategic pattern inefficient
Strategic alternatives Alternatives to the established strategic pattern
Reactions to crisis Responses to the rationality shift
Response outcome Success/failure of responses (indications of the ability to take alternative
strategic actions)
Underlying logic of strategic activities
Strategic discourse Central topics debated in the observed industry (indications of a cognitive
lock-in)




Premises about the organizational self-understanding and the environment
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also Sydow et al. 2012b). Thus, this procedure not only facilitated the necessary
verification of path dependence as the specific form of observed rigidity but also
enabled the reconstruction of the path’s underlying strategic premises.
Second, when I was confident that I had a rich understanding of the observed path
and the underlying strategic premises, I complemented the deducted set of codes with
further coding categories that emerged from the data (Klag and Langley 2013).
Consistent with the research question, I paid particular attention to how the
reconstructed strategic premises were stabilized by coding corresponding instances
with in vivo codes on the basis of terms or phrases that appeared in the data (Miles
and Huberman 1994). This procedure resulted in an extensive list of 76 codes that
contained considerable code overlaps. Accordingly, I merged the generated codes
that were similar in both character and purpose (Van Maanen 1979). Furthermore, I
checked for the completeness and consistency of the coding scheme in debriefing
sessions with colleagues (Isabella 1990). I repeated this process until I could not
identify any additional code overlaps. To establish coding reliability, I employed a
second coder who used the developed coding schemes. Dividing the number of
agreements by the number of agreements and disagreements yielded a reliability
rating of .86, which indicated an acceptable level (Miles and Huberman 1994). Then,
I discussed and resolved all disagreements with the second coder. For theoretical
abstraction, I checked for possibilities to further categorize the generated codes by
considering linkages among them (Yin 2014). This was not a linear process; instead,
I iteratively moved between the developed codes and emerging patterns to develop
conceptual categories (Eisenhardt 1989). The tools for constant comparison that the
qualitative data analysis software contains provided considerable assistance in
identifying further category nestings (see also Clark et al. 2010; Dacin et al. 2010).
Based on this analytical procedure, I formed higher-order categories that facilitated
an interpretation of the data at a more abstract level (Van Maanen 1979). As
illustrated in Fig. 3, I theoretically distilled four mechanisms that stabilize strategic
premises, the retention of which inhibits the deviation from established strategic
patterns despite an ongoing crisis. During the analysis, it became clear that the
mechanisms that emerged from the data could be characterized either as a reflexive
mode of processing market feedback or as a generative mode of producing market
Tapering market feedback 
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outcomes. Accordingly, I further assigned these mechanisms to either one of two
aggregate dimensions that specify these modes.
4 Findings
To provide a comprehensive description of the identified mechanisms that stabilize
strategic premises, I structure the case description in line with the analytical steps
that were necessary to explore these mechanisms. Thus, at the outset, I describe the
path in which the incumbent funeral homes in Berlin were trapped, how the
organizations entered a severe crisis, and how they reacted to the crisis (Koch 2008,
2011). Then, I reconstruct the underlying strategic premises that entrenched the
funeral homes’ strategic activities and led to the pathological reproduction of the
path. Last, I describe how the funeral homes stabilized these strategic premises
despite the ongoing crisis.
4.1 Path description, crisis, and reactions to the crisis
Organizations operating in the funeral industry in Berlin lived through startlingly
successful times particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s. This era—known as the
‘‘Golden Age’’ (Expert 12)—was extraordinary because success required little
effort.
It just went well. They just had to be there. Quality and service did not play
any role. (Expert 6)
This beneficial position may partly be explained by the provision of funeral
allowances from statutory providers of health insurance that granted the bereaved
greater financial scope. However, despite the low importance of the provided quality
at the time, the funeral homes counted on repurchases at later times of need.
There are cycles: someone was here five years ago, ten years ago, or even
longer ago. The next death happens within the family or the circle of
acquaintances, and then, they come back […], and so on. This is, of course, the
best or the classical line. (Expert 1)
Due to the limitation of demand being related to death and the highly competitive
market situation, retaining a regular customer base generated a steady stream of
revenue that ensured the funeral homes’ continued existence. Instead of counter-
acting the switch of customers to other market players by competing on quality or
price (Porter 1980), the funeral homes relied on their ‘‘catchment area in which the
people selected a funeral home in their vicinity [but] the funeral homes as such
hardly differ’’ (Expert 8). In line with this ‘‘territorial thing’’ (Expert 14), a ‘‘non-
aggression pact’’ between organizations ensured that a competitive situation within
the industry would not emerge.
Among older companies […], there is a sort of code of honor […]. You don’t
go there with a pound of coffee and say, ‘Here I am. Just call me.’ (Expert 4)
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Thus, this non-aggression pact required organizations to decline to acquire new
customers and to rely on their own established clientele. The more organizations
that complied with this code, the more attractive reliance on regular customers
became due to the lower risk of competitive pressures. Accordingly, the focus on
regular customers was driven by ‘‘coordination effects,’’ a self-reinforcing
mechanism of path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009).
However, the neutralization of competition did not render customer satisfaction
entirely irrelevant because consumers could potentially switch to competitors on
their own due to dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the code may have stifled active
initiatives to acquire new customers, but it could not prevent passive enlargements
of the customer base through testimonials from existing customers.
We not only exist due to the [customers living] here but also due to […] many
former […] customers that recommend us throughout Berlin. (Expert 4)
Thus, reputation—consumers’ judgments of organizational capacities to create
value (Rindova et al. 2005)—played an important role both for the retention and the
enlargement of the customer base beyond the immediate catchment area. The value
of reputation as a driver of repurchases only unfolds when organizations comply
with consumer expectations (Mishina et al. 2012). Accordingly, strategic activities
became increasingly tied to the perceived market demand and condensed to a
reproduced strategic pattern. Consistent with the comparably high portion of church
members among the inhabitants of Berlin during the Golden Age, traditional
funerals mostly contained uniform rites consistent with Christian traditions.
Funeral services were held by reverends, such that they always followed a
certain sequence of events. (Expert 8)
Thus, by constructing the service concept according to perceived consumer
expectations, leveraging reputation was tightly connected to ‘‘adaptive expectation
effects,’’ another self-reinforcing mechanism of path dependence that drove the
funeral homes’ focus on regular customers (Sydow et al. 2009).
Although funeral services were highly complex and composed of many
components, the coffin was ‘‘the invoice item that contains the largest profit
margin’’ (Expert 1). Pricing one component considerably higher than its acquisition
price and adding most of the other items of the service for free obscured the cost
structure of the service. Furthermore, it was ‘‘an absolute taboo to quote prices’’
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(Expert 6). Therefore, the organizations avoided giving consumers cost estimates
other than by oral communication in the funeral home. In this way, the
comparability of offers between different funeral homes was lowered, and the
code—as a mechanism to reduce competition in the industry—was reinforced.
Because the lack of available information required consumers to rely on past
experiences and/or recommendations, the traditional service concept also reinforced
reputation as a driver of the pattern. The strategic pattern and the driving
mechanisms are summarized in Fig. 4.
The end of the Golden Age of funeral homes began in the 1990s, when the
competitive landscape started to change. During this time, so-called ‘‘discount
funeral homes’’ entered the market. From the beginning, these new market players
attempted to attract consumers with heavy price advertising.
One of the leading [funeral] discounters advertised in the press with an opened
coffin and with the slogan, ‘The Aldi [low-priced discount retail chain] of
funeral homes.’ (Expert 2)
Particularly because of the stabilizing nature of the non-aggression pact among
incumbents that had facilitated the success of the strategic pattern, such market
activities had been unknown in the industry. Although only a few discount players
initially entered the funeral market and gained market share slowly, competition
intensified when more and more discount funeral homes were opened. The service
concept of the discount funeral homes eventually took off by the end of the 1990s in
parallel with the emergence of the Internet.
During that time, something emerged that had not existed before: there were
[discount] funeral homes that offered funerals on the Internet and sold them
supra-regionally. (Expert 12)
With the introduction of Internet offers, discount funeral homes gained a
dominant market position and ‘‘simply destroyed the funeral industry’’ (Expert 4).
Because of the low visibility of Internet purchases, not even societal norms could
prevent consumers from switching to discounters. Because the new market players
sold their services supra-regionally, the non-aggression pact among the incumbent
funeral homes could no longer guarantee repurchases by regular customers. Thus,
the code lost its self-reinforcing attractiveness and ‘‘did not play a big role
anymore’’ (Expert 11). Accordingly, competition in this industry turned into ‘‘cut
and thrust’’ (Expert 12). Furthermore, press articles increasingly criticized the
opacity of the strategic pattern, which destabilized organizational reputation as a
central driver. With the fall of these self-reinforcing mechanisms that had ensured
the success of the strategic pattern, this pattern failed, as became manifest in the
drastic decline in revenue (see Fig. 2).
Despite these threatening developments, ‘‘the slowest industry in the entire
world’’ (Expert 6) responded hesitantly to competitive attacks. Once the incumbents
felt the urgent need for action along with rapidly declining revenue, they reacted to
the crisis in various ways. First, they generated cost reductions primarily through
layoffs because ‘‘labor costs are one of the largest cost factors that we have’’ (Expert
4). To facilitate further reductions in end prices, the incumbents followed the
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practices of the discount funeral homes and offered funeral packages that contained
fewer elements. As Expert 8 explained, ‘‘those offers really are very, very simple,
the simplest possible.’’
Second, the incumbent funeral homes shifted their attention to their reputation.
Service reliability became a predominant guideline in interactions with customers to
satisfy their needs and to ensure repurchase—even at the expense of current profit
margins.
We survive […] on our regular customers […] or customers that recommend
us because they have received honest advice, for example, because we may
have said, ‘For cremation, take the simplest coffin.’ (Expert 4)
Third, the incumbents hesitantly engaged in marketing activities. In contrast to
the discounters’ aggressive communication tactics, the incumbents’ marketing
techniques focused on ‘‘search engine optimization’’ (Expert 1) on the Internet to
ensure that they would be found easily by consumers, which ‘‘has become entirely
normal’’ (Expert 11) in the industry.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, these changes did not modify the strategic pattern but
were instead aimed to retain it. The incumbents compensated for the decay of the—
albeit never entirely abolished—code by strengthening organizational reputation as
the driving mechanism. Accordingly, marketing activities were not designed to
aggressively acquire new customers but to communicate a desirable reputation for
reliable service (e.g., ‘‘Established since…’’) to convert reached consumers into
regular customers before competitors could do so. However, the focus on reputation
did not lead to a clear-cut differentiation between competing funeral homes because
‘‘the people come to us because they know that they will be well served—which
applies to most funeral homes’’ (Expert 8). Furthermore, cost reductions changed
very little about the traditional service concept except for the elimination of service
components in complementary low-cost packages.
Although the reactions to the crisis led to a temporary upswing in revenues (see
Fig. 2), any positive outcome of these efforts collapsed down when consumers’
financial scope was reduced by the abolition of funeral allowances in 2004.
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Although the funeral homes perceived this event as a critical ‘‘upheaval in the
market’’ (Expert 1), they did not react to this market change any differently despite
the intensification of the crisis: revenues in the funeral industry in Berlin dropped
even further and have never recovered (see Fig. 2). Along with the path-dependent
dynamics described above, this development indicates that the organizations had
entirely forfeited their scope of action and did not perceive any strategic alternatives
(Koch 2008, 2011).
4.2 Strategic premises
Paths essentially become frozen because strategic premises remain uncontested
(Rothmann 2013; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). To illustrate how strategic premises
are stabilized despite the intense forces of organizational crises, I reconstruct the
underlying premises in the following section. Because organizational perceptions of
the environment may not be understood without reflecting on the premises that
organizations have about themselves, I first describe the self-understanding of
incumbent organizations in the focal industry (Porac and Thomas 1989).
4.2.1 Organizational self-understanding
The incumbent funeral homes in Berlin perceived themselves to offer services based
on two types of competences. First, they relied on a technical competence that they
leveraged to arrange professional burials. Because these funeral homes primarily
operated as agencies that took orders from customers and forwarded them to
subcontractors, burial was predominantly a coordinative ‘‘office job’’ (Expert 8) that
required funeral directors to ‘‘make phone calls or write emails’’ (Expert 4).
Second, the incumbent funeral homes leveraged a counseling competence that
was targeted at finding a form of funeral that would best match a consumer’s needs.
Consistent with the complexity of funeral services due to the combination of
numerous elements, the counseling appointment was viewed as central to the entire
service process. As Expert 8 explained, ‘‘there are many small pieces that need to be
discussed […]. That’s what I’m here for.’’
The complexity of the provided service seemed to require a direct and personal
contact with customers in time-consuming counseling appointments. Therefore, the
funeral homes could leverage their counseling competence to achieve quasi-
permanent customer retention because ‘‘those who return after 5 years often want to
talk to the same advisor, particularly because they had revealed many intimate
details’’ (Expert 1). Consequently, the funeral homes predominantly defined
themselves by referring to their counseling competence—‘‘the noblest task’’ (Expert
4)—because it reproduced reliable results over time consistent with the very
definition of a competence (Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007).
4.2.2 Strategic premises about the environment
The incumbents primarily ascribed the persistence of discount funeral homes to
societal developments: the perceived ‘‘disposal mentality, the wave on which the
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discount funeral homes swim’’ (Expert 12). Accordingly, the incumbents perceived
a general attitude of disinterest in decent funerals and a tendency to demand
inexpensive funerals in line with the motto ‘‘the cheaper, the better’’ (Expert 4). The
incumbents described this decay of values as ‘‘a regional thing’’ (Expert 13) because
vast parts of the population in Berlin had broken away from the religious traditions
and values that had formed social cohesion. In the resulting vacuum of anonymity,
social pressures were virtually non-existent.
There are no societal norms anymore that determine a certain standard, such
that I would have to be careful that I don’t do anything wrong because others
would talk about it. (Expert 1)
The funeral homes perceived that these social pressures determined the extent to
which consumers would be willing to pay for funerals: with the decay of societal
norms, customers were offered ‘‘the simplest coffin [if] no one will see it’’ (Expert
4). Due to the perceived connection between social pressures and consumer choice,
the funeral homes conceived that there would be a low willingness to pay for
funerals due to the decay of social pressures. They perceived these shifts even
across institutional frameworks, as highlighted in the following:
There are differences between [Berlin’s] districts. […] But the trend is the
same in these areas: [a funeral] should not cost anything anymore. (Expert 8)
However, the premise of a low willingness to pay was not only based on a lack of
social pressure. With the final abolishment of funeral allowances in 2004,
consumers had to pay the full cost of funerals. Accordingly, the funeral homes
expected a further decline in willingness to pay because ‘‘if someone else pays, you
don’t look at the money’’ (Expert 13), but consumers supposedly did once the
financial aid disappeared. However, the premise of a low willingness to pay for
funerals was not exclusively connected to consumers’ financial scope because
consumers were believed to prefer cheap funerals ‘‘even if grandma has saved
money in a savings account’’ (Expert 4).
This belief in consumers’ low willingness to pay was nurtured by a second
strategic premise: consumers were perceived to have no idea of the benefits of a
decent funeral.
It plays a role that [consumers] do not understand: what does it mean that
someone dies? What is a grave? What does this have to do with reverence?
(Expert 8)
Thus, consumers were perceived to have little knowledge of the topics of death
and dying. This resulted from a lack of prior experience due to long repurchase
cycles and the lack of the legitimacy of an open discourse in society. Accordingly,
the incumbents perceived that consumers would ‘‘not want to talk about this topic’’
(Expert 6) between deaths, which explained the industry’s hesitance toward pre-
order marketing activities. Furthermore, this premise of consumer ‘‘nescience’’
implied that the funeral homes’ central counseling competence unfolded its value.
In this way, the funeral homes could leverage their counseling competence, which
constituted their identity as experts who understood the daily realities of funerals,
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or, as Expert 5 stated, ‘‘the view that funeral directors have is not the view that the
bereaved have.’’
The pre-condition of consumer nescience of funeral homes’ core competence
reveals the dilemma in which the funeral homes were trapped. On the one hand,
they were not interested in comprehensively informing consumers ex-ante of funeral
services because their counseling competence would have become worthless. On the
other hand, consumer nescience implied that willingness to pay would be low due to
a lack of appreciation for funeral services. However, the non-transparent pricing
policies revealed that the perceived willingness to pay varied depending on the
elements of the services.
Taking care of the dead—this is a service that we can directly bill. […] We
can bill [the other components of the funeral service] on an hourly basis, but
many funeral directors are concerned that customers will say, ‘What is this
supposed to cost? Thirty or 40 Euros per hour? Okay, I’ll do this myself.’
Therefore, there are still many funeral directors who […] place a large profit
margin on the coffin and do not list other components on the bill at all. (Expert
1)
Thus, as perceived by the incumbents, uninformed consumers had a low
willingness to pay for funeral services and informed consumers were even more
unwilling to pay. Whereas consumers seemed to accept payments related to funeral
homes’ technical competence, the organizations needed to finance all of their other
activities, including those related to their counseling competence, primarily ‘‘by
selling the coffin’’ (Expert 4). The funeral homes reacted to the crisis consistently by
retaining the traditional service concept and, apart from the coffin, excluding
peripheral components. In this way, their technical competence gained value as a
result of the very existence of the strategic premise of a low willingness to pay to the
extent that organizational competences and corresponding strategic premises
mutually enforced and reinforced each other.
As illustrated in Fig. 6, this arrangement ensured that strategic off-path
alternatives were eliminated from the scope of action: although the willingness to
pay for funeral services was assumed to be low, ‘‘people in this country are willing
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to pay, even for strange service offers’’ (Expert 5). Thus, a ‘‘differentiation strategy’’
of providing added value through innovative services for which customers would be
willing to pay would have been a promising alternative to recover and sustain rents
in this market (Breuer and Daumann 2010; Porter 1980). Although the funeral
industry was (and still is) highly regulated and dependent on subcontractors, the
legal framework and the assembly of services provided by suppliers granted a broad
scope for creativity to provide added value because ‘‘anything is possible with
regard to funerals’’ (Expert 6).
4.3 The stabilization of strategic premises
The mutually reinforcing strategic premises of the organizations about their self-
understanding and consumers excluded off-path activities from the scope of action
and remained uncontested over the focal period. In the following section, I provide
insights into the stabilization of these premises despite the intense crisis that struck
the industry.
4.3.1 Tapering market feedback
Although widespread media coverage on issues related to the funeral industry
provided considerable feedback that signaled the need for an update of strategic
premises, there was still a large potential for myopic blind spots. In particular, the
incumbents’ strong position during the successful Golden Age was accompanied by
the blinding effects of complacency that became a burden during the period of
interest. This became particularly evident when the discounters entered the market:
because the incumbents ascribed neither a counseling competence nor a technical
competence to the new market players and, therefore, reasoned that ‘‘this [was] not a
funeral home’’ (Expert 5), they were hesitant to react to the changed competitive
landscape. These effects of complacency were amplified by the structural
peculiarities of the market environment. In particular, the long repurchase cycles
between deaths seemed to play a critical role.
Last week, a person called me and said, ‘I just wanted to check this number.
We dealt with each other in the 1980s the last time and I just wanted to see
whether your company still exists.’ (Expert 13)
Such infrequent interactions between deaths inhibited the absorption of timely
market feedback directly from customers. Therefore, feedback ‘‘also reaches the
funeral industry but, of course, with a delay of 10 years’’ (Expert 6).
Furthermore, the funeral homes’ peculiar collaborations with suppliers aggra-
vated this effect. Because the funeral homes handed over most of the service
delivery to subcontractors, customer contact was reduced to the counseling
appointment and a few phone calls at the beginning of the value chain; thus, ‘‘the
burial happens without the presence of the funeral director’’ (Expert 4). Because the
funeral homes could not obtain feedback after funerals, they had to rely on feedback
from repurchases, which seemed to result in distorted perceptions.
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They call me again and again. Of course, you never know who does not call
[me], right? (Expert 4)
Because the funeral homes seemed unable to trace the customers who did not
return, they could only obtain feedback from those customers who did return.
However, their feedback hardly seemed to disconfirm strategic premises because
‘‘there is hardly anyone who says, ‘I did not like what we did 20 years ago’’’ (Expert
8). Because customers in the funeral industry in Berlin ‘‘hardly ever complain but it
is possible that they will never return’’ (Expert 13), it seemed hardly possible for
negative feedback to reach the funeral homes. Such tapered market feedback
appeared to minimize doubts about the timeliness of strategic premises.
4.3.2 Rectifying market feedback
Even when negative feedback reached the organizations, it did not necessarily result
in a contestation of their strategic premises despite the intensity of the industry’s
crisis. Instead, the organizations interpreted market feedback in a way that
reinforced their strategic premises. From an observational perspective, certain
environmental changes could have been interpreted and enacted differently, as
illustrated by a comment on the social pressures in rural areas:
The neighbors will also attend the ceremony. [Thus, the bereaved says,] ‘I
don’t want to attract attention. It shouldn’t be too cheap and it shouldn’t be too
exotic.’ They try to muddle through and, unfortunately, don’t choose what
they would have preferred. (Expert 6)
Thus, the reduction of social pressures in Berlin entailed individualized freedom
of choice for consumers, which could have broadened the range of variety for
innovative off-path activities. However, this societal development was interpreted
consistently with proprietary assumptions of a low willingness to pay to the extent
that the incoming feedback did not disconfirm the organizations’ strategic premises,
allowing them to retain these premises.
Beyond that, the organizations provided various normative reasons to retain their
strategic pattern in reference to their strategic premises. Most notably, the premise
of a low willingness to pay entered the discourse in two ways. In the context of
declining conventional funerals, customers were perceived to be liable to a decay of
values consistent with the ‘‘disposal mentality.’’ In the context of innovative
strategic alternatives, consumers were described as so strongly value-affiliated that
they would reject innovative offers. As Expert 6 stated,
Dealing with death, mourning, dying, funerals … all people become
conservative again. (Expert 6)
Based on this logic, the funeral homes hardly seem to have referred to the same
consumers in these two contexts, as neither the buyers of discount funerals could be
termed as ‘‘value-affiliated,’’ nor could the ‘‘conservative’’ consumers conceive
discount funerals to be appropriate. However, with such narrative inflections, the
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funeral homes could rationalize the established pattern and eliminate any need for
questioning their strategic premises.
4.3.3 Framing consumer choice
Such interpretations of, and responses to, feedback constitute reflexive modes of
stabilizing established strategic premises. However, the funeral homes also engaged
in market activities that produced reinforcing market outcomes, as illustrated below:
If the funeral director has 16 coffins in his show room with 15 made of oak or
pine and a palm-leaf carving and one that is halfway modern… it’s a foreign
particle, exotic: no consumer would dare to take that one. (Expert 6)
Thus, the incumbents pre-selected their offers prior to presenting them to
consumers. This pre-selection occurred not only as described by physically
presenting only certain items but also by arranging catalogues that served as the
basis for assembling the service. Because the strategic pattern was oriented toward
satisfying regular customers, such pre-selections were guided by the consideration
of whether ‘‘this [new service component would] fit with my customer target group’’
(Expert 12). Thus, strategic premises about consumer needs essentially predeter-
mined which service packages would be offered to consumers. Because of the
peculiar situation in which ‘‘the [consumers] are frequently […] distressed [and]
don’t know what they want’’ (Expert 6), such pre-selection could essentially guide
consumer choice. Accordingly, based on the premise of a low willingness to pay for
additional service items or innovative components that would yield higher profit
margins, ‘‘most [funeral homes] would probably say, ‘I can’t sell [these items]’’’
(Expert 10), with the consequence that these alternatives were excluded from the
scope of action. Such guiding pre-selections generated market outcomes that would
not disconfirm strategic premises, although consumers presumably had freedom of
choice.
In addition to physical pre-selections, funeral homes could also set narrative
frames by using their counseling competence. For instance, by asking ‘‘‘which
coffin do you prefer, this one or that one?,’ I guide [consumers] to making a
decision. And they cannot say, ‘yes’ or ‘no’’’ (Expert 4). This principle seemed to
work similarly for the organization of further components of the funeral ceremony:
[Simulating a conversation with a customer] It’s your funeral ceremony. If you
want to have a priest, you’ll get one. Even if you don’t go to church, we know
various priests who don’t care whether you go to church or not. (Expert 12)
Thus, independent of customers’ religious denomination, the traditional service
concept was not questioned and, therefore, the resulting orders of the base of regular
customers, albeit ‘‘diminishing’’ (Expert 6), did not provide any reason to update
strategic premises. In this way, the funeral homes ‘‘guide [consumers] through this
time of farewell like operators of a river lock—and there, [they] can exert
influence’’ (Expert 5).
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4.3.4 Shaping consumer choice
Framed consumer choice essentially produced reinforcing market outcomes when
consumers were unable or unwilling to search for alternatives on their own.
However, even if consumers actively approached incumbent funeral homes with
more innovative ideas beyond the traditional service concept, their realization was
anything but certain.
[On innovative ideas] We inform and give advice and say, ‘Does this make
sense?’ […] I would somehow attempt to persuade everyone that this is
actually nonsense. (Expert 13)
Thus, as self-appointed experts in the funeral industry, the incumbents ‘‘guide
people during the counseling appointment to where [they] want to have them’’
(Expert 4) by leveraging their counseling competence to deter consumers from
innovative ideas. Because they were programmed to provide a reliable service to
facilitate repurchases on later occasions, they gave advice by enacting their
premises about consumers. Because consumers were perceived to have a low
willingness to pay for services beyond the technical part of a funeral, the funeral
homes hoped to be rewarded by dissuading them from higher-priced offers and,
instead, recommending lower-priced services, e.g., ‘‘very simple coffins’’ (Expert
13) for cremations. In this way, consumers’ low willingness to pay seemed to have
become ‘‘a self-made problem’’ (Expert 6): by heavily promoting low-priced offers
that conformed to their own strategic premises, the funeral homes seemed to have
contributed to the very emergence of a low willingness to pay and ‘‘destroyed the
market themselves’’ (Expert 6). Thus, consumers could not only be deterred from
choices that would disconfirm strategic premises but consumer choice could also be
made compatible.
Sometimes, the ideas are a bit odd. Then, you surely need to bring them into a
straight line. (Expert 8)
By aligning consumer choice with the traditional service concept, the organi-
zations produced market outcomes that did not disconfirm their strategic premises,
and the need for an update was eliminated.
5 Discussion
The case of the path-dependent incumbents in the funeral industry in Berlin
illustrates how the underlying premises of strategic paths may be retained and
stabilized despite the shock-inducing forces of crises. Thus, the present study
challenges the central assumption of research on path dependence and incumbents’
rigidities in the face of changes in the environment that the reception of strongly
negative feedback through an organizational crisis leads to an update of strategic
premises (e.g., Levinthal and March 1993; Vergne and Durand 2010, 2011).
Because ‘‘path dependence cannot be exhaustively described by a set of theoretical
propositions [but] is located in the realm of mechanism-based theorizing’’ (Dobusch
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and Kapeller 2013: 291 et seq., emphasis in original; see also Durand and Vaara
2009), I theoretically distilled mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises in lock-
ins, even in times of crisis. As illustrated in Fig. 7, this study indicates that strategic
premises may be stabilized by (1) tapering market feedback; (2) rectifying market
feedback; (3) framing consumer choice; and (4) shaping consumer choice. Thus, a
contribution that this work offers is to provide tentative insights into the
stabilization of strategic premises in lock-ins, which has not been fully explored
to date despite the powerful insights into the pathological reproduction of paths that
it provides (Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009; Dobusch and Schu¨ßler 2013;
Rothmann and Koch 2014). The identification of these mechanisms also has broader
theoretical implications for the concept of path dependence and the literature on
incumbents’ rigidities in the face of changes in the environment. I present and
discuss these implications in the following.
5.1 Processing market feedback: disconfirming feedback
and the contestation of strategic premises
The findings of the present study indicate that the way path-dependent organizations
process feedback may stabilize strategic premises. In particular, I identified the
reduction and modulation of incoming market feedback—i.e., tapering market
feedback and rectifying market feedback—as stabilizing mechanisms. The evidence
of this study suggests that these theorized mechanisms seem to filter out deviant
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Fig. 7 The stabilization of strategic premises
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market feedback and lead to a re-interpretation of received signals to create
coherence with strategic premises. Consequently, incoming feedback hardly seems
to disconfirm the strategic premises in place. Therefore, these mechanisms seem to
reduce the perceived need for an update of strategic premises.
These findings reinforce well-known ideas of ‘‘myopia’’ through a path-
confirming organizational context that avoids deviant feedback (e.g., Eggers and
Kaplan 2013; Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009; Koch 2011). However, the
presented findings extend beyond these ideas: while these works predominantly
suggest that organizations with deeply engrained strategic premises seem to filter
out weak signals of a misfit with the environment but hardly ignore the strongly
negative feedback generated by a crisis, the presented findings suggest that strongly
negative feedback does not serve this disruptive function in all cases (Schreyo¨gg
and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). Instead, path-dependent organizations may process
feedback in such a way that strategic premises are not disconfirmed. Thus, this
study coincides with Koch et al.’s (2009) assertion that the myopia-focused
discourse on failed adjustments of strategic premises in the literature on
incumbents’ rigidities and path dependence may not fully reflect the complexity
of the processes involved—especially in times of crisis. I offer a step toward
increasing complexity in theorizing this phenomenon by identifying underlying
mechanisms that lead to the retention of strategic premises despite strongly
disconfirming feedback through organizational crises. These findings suggest that
strongly disconfirming feedback as such may not necessarily lead to a contestation
of strategic premises; an update of strategic premises seems to depend on how path-
dependent organizations process this feedback. Based on my evidence, it appears
that the identified mechanisms of processing market feedback tightly constrain the
possibilities of updating strategic premises because of the avoidance or modulation
of deviant feedback that severe organizational crises generate. Thus, this study
offers a more nuanced understanding of the avoidance of updating strategic
premises through disconfirming feedback in lock-ins that extends beyond the
holistic ascription of myopia.
5.2 Producing market outcomes: the generative influence of path-
dependent organizations on their environment
Whereas these forms of processing market feedback constitute reflexive modes of
stabilizing strategic premises, the presented findings suggest that path-dependent
organizations may also rely on a set of generative modes for this purpose. Based on
my evidence, it appears that these mechanisms produce market outcomes that
stabilize strategic premises. In particular, I identified the exclusion of, and active
interventions against, undesired offers in interactions with consumers as two further
mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises, i.e., framing consumer choice and
shaping consumer choice. The findings indicate that these theorized mechanisms
seem to be aimed at generating market outcomes that create coherence with
strategic premises. Consequently, the perceived market outcomes hardly seem to
disconfirm strategic premises. Therefore, the production of market outcomes in line
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with strategic premises seems to reduce the perceived need for an update of these
premises.
The presented findings indicate that the affected organizations did not necessarily
act with unsound intentions. Instead, they were guided by their strategic premises
about consumers, i.e., what they thought consumers wanted, in their hope of being
rewarded through repurchases (Tripsas 2009). Thus, in line with the retained
premise of a low willingness to pay, the funeral homes gutted their offers in
response to the crisis and promoted these offers in counseling appointments, which
seems to have contributed to the tense market situation in the funeral industry in
Berlin. Accordingly, these findings provide evidence supporting the view that, in
contrast to stochastic processes in technological contexts, path dependence in
managerial contexts seems to be a social process that is endogenously created in and
though organizations’ own decisions and actions (Duschek 2010; Greve and Seidel
2014; Koch 2011; MacKay and Chia 2013; Sydow et al. 2009). However, the
presented findings extend beyond this idea of path dependence to the extent that
they emphasize the generative influence that path-dependent organizations may
have on their environment. While the extant literature on path dependence and
related research predominantly focuses on the reception and enactment of positive
feedback from market outcomes, the findings in the present study indicate that path-
dependent processes may not only be affected by the environment in which they are
embedded (Dobusch and Schu¨ßler 2013; Koch et al. 2009); rather, path-dependent
organizations may also conversely shape their environment to a certain extent (see
also Burgelman 1991; Child 1997). With that, the study indicates that the strategic
premises of path-dependent organizations may not only ‘‘self-perpetuate’’, as the
literature on incumbents’ rigidities and path dependence suggests (e.g., Gilbert
2006; Miller 1994; Koch 2011). Instead, path-dependent organizations may also
generatively produce market outcomes that reduce the need for an update of
strategic premises. Thus, the presented findings open the theoretical perspective for
the endogenous creation of market outcomes in path-dependent processes that
extend beyond the enactment of received feedback in strategic decisions.
5.3 Agency and path reproduction
Opening the theoretical perspective for a generative role of path-dependent
organizations, i.e., the production of market outcomes, inherently leads to the
question of agency in path-dependent processes. Whereas framing and shaping
consumer choice seemed to occur partly ‘‘behind the backs’’ (Sydow et al. 2012b:
155) by following strategic premises in the presentation and promotion of offers, a
more active role in directing consumer choice may not entirely be excluded. If the
existence of agency may be assumed at least to a certain extent, the main question
then is how path-dependent organizations use their agency.
In contrast to ‘‘path creation,’’ which addresses intentional deviations from
established strategic patterns, this study reveals the (at least partially) mindful
reproduction of strategic patterns by producing market outcomes that do not
disconfirm the underlying strategic premises (Garud and Karnøe 2001). In line with
previous studies, this paper highlights the constraining forces of strategic premises
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in conducting strategic change when the premises remain uncontested (e.g.,
Rothmann and Koch 2014; Tripsas 2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Accordingly,
this study provides further evidence that the counterfactual reproduction of paths
may not simply be a ‘‘failure to act’’ (Weick 1979: 149). Instead, the organizations
invested tremendous efforts to respond to the crisis, but these were reminiscent of
‘‘the dynamics of standing still’’ (Sull 1999): the responses were aimed at restoring
the efficiency of the formerly successful strategic pattern and improved the
economic situation in the short run but were unsuccessful in the long run (see also
Gilbert 2005; MacKay and Chia 2013; Rothmann and Koch 2014). While prior
works rely mainly on resource-based and routine-based reasons to explain this
phenomenon and holistically refer to uncontested strategic premises as the root of
lacking deviations from the path, this study develops complementary insights (e.g.,
Eggers and Kaplan 2013; Gilbert 2005, 2006; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000): by
identifying mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises in lock-ins even in times of
crisis, this study sheds further light on how and why organizations that are affected
by ‘‘the dynamics of standing still’’ retain their strategic premises despite the
strongly disconfirming feedback that their crisis generates and only conduct slight
adjustments to their strategic pattern.
By identifying the production of market outcomes as one cluster of mechanisms
that stabilize strategic premises to reproduce the path, the present study provides
indications of how path-dependent organizations may use agency if it is assumed to
exist in path-dependent processes: if strategic premises are deeply engrained, path-
dependent organizations with such entrenched premise structures hardly seem to use
their agency to break, or possibly even to create a new, but instead to ‘‘extend’’ the
path by producing market outcomes that coincide with the path’s underlying
strategic premises. In fact, the presented findings correspond with prior accounts of
path extension to the extent that the incumbent funeral homes continuously
conducted strategic activities that are closely related to the established strategic
pattern (Duschek 2010; Meyer and Schubert 2007; Sydow et al. 2012a). However,
while these works have emphasized path extension as a form of ‘‘strategic path
management’’ to keep the path alive (e.g., Duschek 2010), this study presents the
case of a self-destructive ‘‘extension’’ of the path in times of crisis. Because the very
production of market outcomes in line with strategic premises—especially of a low
willingness to pay—seemed to have intensified the critical market situation, the
reproduction of the path became even more a burden and eventually led to a
situation in which the funeral homes seemed to ‘‘bury themselves.’’ Thus, by
presenting indicative empirical evidence of how the underlying strategic premises
are stabilized and how these premises inhibit the realization of strategic alternatives,
this study sheds further light on the pathological reproduction of paths despite fierce
organizational crises (Sydow et al. 2012a). With that, this study offers a tentative
step forward in ‘‘[t]he ongoing process of building a theory of disruption’’
(Christensen 2006: 39) that attempts to illuminate incumbents’ challenges to
conduct strategic change in the face of changes in the environment (Eggers and
Kaplan 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman 2013; Tripsas 2009).
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5.4 Additional research questions
While the presented findings offer a number of theoretical contributions to the
literature on path dependence and related research, these findings also raise a
number of interesting questions for future research. The question of generalizability
certainly is an important one. As with all case studies, the qualitative data on which
the findings of this study are based did not permit statistical generalization but
instead required theorizing efforts via theoretical abstraction to achieve analytical
generalization (Yin 2014). Accordingly, I abstracted from the case of incumbent
organizations in the funeral industry by theoretically distilling mechanisms of
premise stabilization. While such a unique and extreme case, a ‘‘talking pig,’’ is
compelling for such theorizing efforts because the studied phenomena may be better
observed, it may impose the challenge that the generated theoretical insights are
hardly transferrable to other contexts (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Siggelkow 2007).
However, a remarkable number of prior studies have identified similar patterns of
premise stability, path reproduction, and disruption in a broad range of contexts,
such as the automotive industry, the airline industry, the book industry, the camera
industry, the cash register industry, the music industry, the newspaper industry, the
tire industry, and the typesetter industry (Koch 2011; Kunow et al. 2013; MacKay
and Chia 2013; Maielli 2015; Miller and Chen 1994; Rosenbloom 2000; Rothmann
and Koch 2014; Schreyo¨gg et al. 2011; Sull 1999; Tripsas 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti
2000). Furthermore, Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) presumed that path-
dependent organizations that face a crisis seem to have a genuine interest in
enabling the reproduction of their path by producing desired market outcomes and
that processing feedback seems to play an important role in dealing with strategic
premises. In that sense, the findings on how organizations stabilize strategic
premises may be transferrable to path-dependent organizations in crises in different
contexts (Lincoln and Guba 1985). However, based on the analysis in this study, it
may not be concluded that organizations that stabilize strategic premises must
necessarily be path-dependent (Schultz and Hernes 2013); path dependence is just
one among several forms of organizational stability (Sydow et al. 2009). Thus,
while the present study focuses on path-dependent organizations that have entered a
crisis because of severe path disruptions, future research may explore whether these
findings also apply to organizations that are not path-dependent.
Another question concerns the lack of variation among organizations in the
analyzed industry. Consistent with path dependence as a macro-level theory, the
joint analysis of incumbent organizations in the funeral industry, which hardly
differed with regard to their strategic activities and premises, as a holistic single
case did not seem to inhibit the study of the phenomenon of interest (Becker 2004;
Breuer and Daumann 2010; Burgelman 2010; Klein et al. 1994; Yin 2014). Several
prior studies have also observed such convergence of path-dependent organizations
in other mature industries, even across institutional frameworks (e.g., Benner and
Tripsas 2012; Flier et al. 2003; Kunow et al. 2013; Lampel and Shamsie 2003;
Rothmann and Koch 2014; Vergne and Durand 2011). The findings of the present
study indicate that such convergence may be the result of positive feedback
mechanisms that unfold their effects across organizational boundaries. Particularly
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the code, a ‘‘coordination mechanism’’ that required the incumbent funeral homes to
rely on regular customers within their catchment area, seems to have contributed to
a form of territorial ‘‘market differentiation’’ and reduced the need for ‘‘product
differentiation’’ (Porter 1980; Sydow et al. 2009). However, within the scope of this
paper, I was not able to fully reconstruct the origin of this convergence.
Understanding these puzzling convergence phenomena in mature industries would
essentially contribute to explaining the emergence of these industries (Benner and
Tripsas 2012). Therefore, future research may consider exploring the origins of this
convergence in more detail.
Furthermore, the lack of convergence among incumbent funeral homes inhibited
a multiple-case design (Eisenhardt 1989). This research design would have been
required to extend the case analysis beyond the exploration of mechanisms that
stabilize strategic premises by reconstructing the contingent factors through which
the explored mechanisms come into effect (Gilbert 2006); i.e., while the single-case
design of this study seemed to be particularly suitable to theoretically distill
mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises in lock-ins even in times of crisis, the
study abstracts away the contingent factors that trigger the explored mechanisms
(Klag and Langley 2013; Siggelkow 2007; Langley and Abdallah 2011). However,
as Eggers and Kaplan (2013) denoted, empirical phenomena that relate to path
dependence and other forms of incumbents’ rigidities are highly complex and
require researchers to shed light on these phenomena in a tentative and ongoing
process (see also Christensen 2006). The present study’s emphasis on exploring
mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises complies with the need for developing
mechanism-based answers to the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ in organization and
management research in general and the dynamics of managerial scope of action in
particular (e.g., Anderson et al. 2006; Dobusch and Kapeller 2013; Langley et al.
2013). To shed further light on the stabilization of strategic premises in which
strategic paths are embedded, I encourage future research to use a multiple-case
design to explore contingency effects that illuminate under which conditions the
mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises come into effect.
Finally, while this study highlights the fruitfulness of exploring mechanisms that
stabilize strategic premises in the context of path dependence, these mechanisms of
stability may reveal their dual character as mechanisms of change under certain
conditions (Farjoun 2010). For example, Schmidt and Keil (2013) emphasized that
organizations may shape consumer choice to create a willingness to pay for
innovations and, therefore, generate strategic alternatives to the established strategic
pattern. Similarly, tapered market feedback may provide the necessary distance
from current consumer expectations that opens the scope of action for developing
strategic alternatives (Danneels 2003). Thus, the explored mechanisms that stabilize
the underlying strategic premises of a path and lead to its reproduction may also
contribute to changing these premises and opening the scope of action, i.e., these
mechanisms may also help organizations break their path. Because research on
path-breaking activities remains scarce, an exploration of the conditions under
which the mechanisms that stabilize strategic premises eventually turn into
mechanisms of premise change may contribute valuable insights to the field of
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research on path dependence (Garud et al. 2010; Kunow et al. 2013; Sydow et al.
2009).
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